A network-dependent rewarding system: proof-of-mining by Lao, Joe
ar
X
iv
:1
40
9.
79
48
v1
  [
cs
.C
Y]
  2
8 S
ep
 20
14
A network-dependent rewarding system: proof-of-mining
Joe Lao∗
CoinMagi Corporation, Georgia, Atlanta, USA
(Dated: September 30, 2014)
A ’soft’ control of the network activity through varying reward in a proof-of-work (PoW) cryp-
tocurrency is reported. Rewards are the necessity to incent the contributors’ activities (i.e., mining)
in order to maintain the PoW network. Contrary to constant rewarding in a certain period imple-
mented in most of cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin, we propose a network-dependent rewarding model
system, primarily including two phases: 1) activities encouraging phase in which higher rewards are
issued at higher network activities; and 2) discouraging further increase of activities by reducing
rewards. The advantages of this system include 1) fair distribution of rewards among a variety of
contributors, and 2) enforcing a limit to the network activity and hence the cost of maintaining the
PoW network. This mechanism requires network contributors to show their participation in order
to earn maximum rewards, i.e., proof-of-mining.
INTRODUCTION
Maintaining the public ledger (i.e., the block chain)
that records financial transactions is essential to operate
a cryptocurrency system, [1] such as bitcoin, [2] without
interruption. Neither under a centralized bank nor under
a government, sustaining the block chain (so called min-
ing) is fully driven by volunteer-based activities, through
rewarding contributors proportional to their work being
done, i.e., proof-of-work (PoW). This process should be
accomplished without the intermediation of central au-
thority in order to fulfill decentralization. Work-for-pay
means higher rewards are given to one with more work
accomplished. This is acceptable in general, however,
concerns have been raised regarding the profit-driven
hardware competition race, and the global energy con-
sumption; [3] in particular the construction of powerful
hardwares is changing the decentralized and more open
nature of cryptocurrency. [4] There has been several
proposed ’hard’ approaches reported by using memory-
hard algorithm, which increases the difficulty of accom-
plishing PoW works, thus resistant to specialized hard-
wares. Expected will be a reduction of network activities
and thus incentive to generic hardwares. However, un-
der the present rewarding system with constant rewards
over time, it is still tempting for one to build up min-
ing equipment and consequently induces a race in the
generic-hardware level, which is also against the decen-
tralization nature.
In this article, we propose a new block rewarding model
system, operating based on the network activity. The ac-
tivity refers to the mining process, for example in the
bitcoin network, which creates new blocks. The con-
cept behind the rewarding system in order to achieve
fair distribution (decentralization) and suppressing min-
ing hardware race is achieved by encouraging rewards to
higher activities when the network activity on the whole
is low, and by discouraging miners through reducing re-
wards when more powerful equipment comes into the net-
work. It is expected that the block rewards heavily in-
teract with the miners’ activities, leading to a large fluc-
tuations in the rewards due in part to the miners leaving
and rejoining. To acquire maximum rewards, one has
to remain an extended period of mining activities in the
network, i.e., to show the proof of mining (PoM).
A NETWORK-DEPENDENT REWARDING
SYSTEM
The difficulty to find a block is used as a measure of the
network activities. Miners keep finding a target number
(hash) acceptable to the network in order to forge the
public ledger (block), the efficiency of which is evaluated
by the hash rate. Finding new blocks only occurs at pre-
designed time slots, which enforces an adjustment of the
block difficulty in accordance with varying hash rate in
the network. Typical relationship between difficulty and
network hashrate extracted from Coin Magi (XMG) [5]
is shown in Fig. 1.
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FIG. 1. The network difficulty as a function hashrate obtained
from XMG. [5]
The proposed block reward (R) correlates with the dif-
2ficulty (D) through
R ∼
√[
exp(−a · D)− exp(−b · D)] · D, (a < b) (1)
where a and b are empirical parameters. R relies on
√
D
for small values of D, with the line shape tuned by the
exponential functions; at large values of D, exp(−a · D)
dominates. Fig. 2 (a) shows a representative variation of
the block rewards with D.
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FIG. 2. (a) The variation of block rewards with network diffi-
culty in terms of Eq. 1. (b) The actual block rewards used in
a cryptocurrency, XMG. [5]. The block reward at the high-
D side degrades much faster compared to (a), which leads
to efficient adjustment of the network activities. For exam-
ple, block reward is halved when D = 2.20 (II) compared to
the value at I, and equals to 1/10 of the maximum value at
D = 2.37, at which the low rewards will be lack of incentive
to the miners.
DISCUSSION
The rising part of Fig. 2 (a) is of importance to main-
tenance a fair distribution of rewards into public. Since
single person has limited hashing power, we can consider
the network hashrate to be proportional to the number
of miners. It is apparent that the number of miners could
significantly changed over lifetime of mining. Issuing the
same rewards despite that the network consists of 1 or
1000 miners, would result in unfairness. Furthermore,
the amount of reward is disproportional to the hashing
power by noticing such a fact that one who has same
equipment could gain high reward at the early stage of
mining when only a few people are involved. The sit-
uation could be even worse if the mining reward is de-
signed to be decreasing with D; in this case, the initial
miners will acquire significant high percentage of rewards
compared to the subsequent miners. It is therefore very
natural that the block reward should be designed such
that it increases with the number of miners. The early
miners still have the advantage of incremental rewards
over time; this is reasonable to enable rewarding miners’
early participation.
Apparently increasing reward can drive miners towards
building more powerful equipment. Such a consequence
has to be mitigated, which is achieved by the mining
discourage phase at the high-D range. The relationship
between mining costs and returns in consistence with eco-
nomics should be the guideline to achieve the goal. We
assume this is valid throughout this investigation. For ex-
ample, one who has powerful equipment and hence high
cost as well will expect commensurate returns; otherwise,
the cost must be reduced by reducing the usage of equip-
ment. The efficiency of discouraging mining activities is
fully determined how fast the rewards decline with D.
It should be noted that self-adjustment of network dif-
ficulty in accordance with rewards is affected by both
the reward declining rate and the market place of the
cryptocurrency in addition to the declining rate. One
can build up more powerful equipment to compensate
the declining rewards. A much faster declining rate will
disable any possibility of acquiring desired rewards by
simply building more hashing power. Fig. 2 (b) shows
an improved rewarding system as implemented in XMG.
The high-D range is determined by a cut-off function,
similar to the Fermi-Dirac function used in the physical
science:
FCOFD = 1/
[
1 + exp
(D −DCO
α · T
)]
(2)
DCO determines where the decline occurs. T is a quan-
tity of affecting the spread of the declining range. As
for XMG, the maximum block reward is available at
D = 1.75 (I) (or ∼ 40 MHash/s according to Fig. 1). The
reward is halved when D = 2.20 (or ∼ 51 MHash/s) (II),
and equals to 1/10 of the maximum value at D = 2.37 (or
∼ 55 MHash/s), at which the low rewards will be lack of
incentive to the miners. It has been proven that the ratio
of the hashrate of miners higher than 5 Mhash/s over the
total network hashrate is decreased from 47.5 % to 38.4 %
upon the implementation of the new rewarding system,
while the network hashrate decreases from 115 MHash/s
to 83 MHash/s. These quantities are still in varying with
time. It can be concluded that the new block rewarding
system has a significant effect on the miners’ activities.
Continuous increasing of the hash power has been hin-
3dered.
One may expect the market place will affect the min-
ers’ behavior significantly. For example, the high-pricing
reward leads more miners into the network which im-
mediately move the block reward out of the maximum
region. This initiates a self-adjustment of the rewarding
system. Realizing the marginal rewards (e.g., at III of
Fig. 2 (b)), some of the miners start ceasing their min-
ings, thus pushing the reward back to the maximum. In
this case, it will be relatively less advantageous for miners
quickly in and out the mining activity. One will need to
show a proof of mining in order to gain sufficient credits
to declare the rewards.
CONCLUSION
To summary, we have proposed a new block reward-
ing system to achieve fair distribution of block rewards
among miners and to prevent mining equipment compe-
tition as seen in cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin. Under
this system, earlier adopters don’t have significant advan-
tages over the latter adopters. High hashrate is discour-
aged through adjusting the rewards: high rewards are
issued at low network hashrate. It is also observed that
the new system emphasizes the participation of miners
instead of their hashing power, allowing for a new min-
ing mechanism, i.e., proof-of-mining. It is anticipated
that the new block rewarding system leads to a more
decentralized cryptocurrency.
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